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I highly commend Knowledge of God. While I am, no doubt, inclined 
to side with Plantinga in the end, both Plantinga and Tooley do an 
amazing job. The arguments they both lay out are philosophically rich, 
robust, and truly seminal. The main shortcoming of the book, as I see it, 
is a shortcoming of these sorts of debates in general. While the arguments 
levelled in this book are of a high quality and are extremely useful, the 
nature of the debate is such that it spans broad, established disciplines 
with their own worlds of literature. In debating the epistemic status of 
theistic belief, Plantinga and Tooley occasionally make highly contested 
claims about morality, theology, the nature of logic, epistemology, the 
philosophy of mind, etc.  – for example, regarding Plantinga’s second 
objection to naturalism in his opening statement, Tooley notes ‘If 
[Plantinga] is right, then virtually all of philosophy of mind of the past 
half-century or so has been radically off-track.’ – and that may be the 
way it has to be; however, it is, nevertheless, occasionally frustrating and 
dissatisfying (p. 190). regardless, Knowledge of God is an excellent book, 
which I would wholeheartedly recommend to anyone with the interest 
and technical familiarity and certainly to any graduate students studying 
philosophy of religion.
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Robert A. Hinde. Why Gods Persist: A Scientific Approach to Religion 
2nd ed., Routledge, 2010.
Across its history, Christianity and other religions have demonstrated 
a  consistent capacity to respond to ongoing criticism. Those critics, 
whether historical or contemporary, have used various tactics to try 
to undermine religion. Despite the tenacity and ingenuity of these 
criticisms, especially those invested in the modern sciences, a once-and-
for-all challenge to religion is unforthcoming. responding to this fact, 
robert A. Hinde emphasises that ‘something more than a sledgehammer, 
however skilfully it is wielded, is needed. We need to seek a  scientific 
understanding of religion’s extraordinary resilience’ (p.  viii). The aim 
of this book is, then, to provide that understanding of religion, thereby 
enabling, if only in part, the formation of a  ‘a  happier world’ (p.  ix). 
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such programmatic statements are familiar, at least since the early 
enlightenment. Identifying the best ways to understanding religion, 
however, is a  more difficult issue. At the heart of many science and 
religion debates is a methodological problem: what are the most effective 
and legitimate means of structuring those debates? For some writers, the 
obvious answer is to appeal to the physical and human sciences. since 
those sciences enjoy a  considerable cognitive and cultural authority, 
appealing to them can make good sense.
A  problem with such naturalistic approaches is, however, that 
they can tend to load the dice. Why Gods Persist is a good example of 
the tensions generated by naturalistic approach. Its author, robert 
A. Hinde, investigates the ubiquity of religious beliefs by appealing to 
naturalistic methodologies that, implicitly or not, deny the truth of their 
transcendental claims. The ‘scientific approach to religion’ he advocates 
is, therefore, hardly a neutral or impartial approach: it sets up religion as 
an ultimately anomalous phenomena, devoid of evidentiary or rational 
warrant, whose origins and longevity can, then, only be the result of social 
entrenchment, psychological utility, or other such mundane origins. The 
result is an interesting and useful survey of contemporary naturalistic 
theories of religion, but one unlikely to persuade those religious persons 
whose beliefs it is concerned with.
The title of Why Gods Persist indicates the attitude its author takes 
towards religion. The guiding concern of the book is the origin and 
ubiquity of religious belief in human societies, focusing especially 
upon Christianity. Hinde appeals mainly to the biological and human 
sciences to examine our adherence to, and the distribution and value 
of, religion. Two particular facts about the opening chapter of the 
book are worth noting: firstly, the first two authors it cites are richard 
Dawkins and  Daniel Dennett, and second, Hinde consistently refers 
to the value  and significance of religion in the past tense. These two 
facts indicate the partisan approach that Hinde employs and will likely 
determine its readers’ judgement of the persuasiveness of his book.
Why Gods Persist takes as axiomatic the fact that Christianity is 
intellectually confused, incompatible with both science and common 
sense. This axiom then provides the motivation for the books titular 
concern: how has such a  manifestly false system of beliefs persisted? 
Dawkins and Dennett, writes Hinde, ‘have pointed out that the basic 
beliefs of Christian doctrine, taken literally, are simply unacceptable 
to most twentieth-century minds’, due both to ‘inconsistencies with 
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everyday common sense’ and, more urgently, with ‘modern scientific 
knowledge’ (p. 4). but if Christianity does not have truth on its side, how 
can we account for its persistence and evident popularity?
such remarks are, of course, meat and drink to the wide school of 
contemporary critics of religion. That broad church of naturalists  – 
forgive the pun – includes evolutionary psychologists, humanists, ‘new 
atheists’, and more besides. If one shares their conviction that religion 
is an intellectually and morally bankrupt vestige of earlier, irrational 
periods of history, Hinde’s account will be very satisfying. but if one 
is not already persuaded that religion simply reflects ‘principles of 
human functioning that operate also in non-religious contexts’ (p.  7), 
then Hinde’s account will seem question-begging and presumptive. 
For many persons, religious beliefs are neither ‘simply unacceptable’ 
nor incompatible with their common sense: the quotidian experience 
of many persons  – and not just ‘god-intoxicated’ figures like spinoza 
or William Paley  – discloses a  world marked by divine providence or 
transcendental depth.
Hinde’s insistence that religion is a  naturalistic psychosocial 
phenomenon obscures the possibility, attested to by many intelligent 
persons, that one can enjoy religious belief within a  deeply human 
context, one marked by nuanced understandings of the psychological, 
affective, and social aspects of religious belief (for instance, the work of 
John Cottingham over the last decade or so). I  am therefore sceptical 
of the claim, made by Dawkins amongst others, that Hinde manifests 
a  more conciliatory approach to religion than many other naturalists. 
Certainly this book is happily free of the polemic of other books, but its 
explicit commitment to a  naturalistic interpretation of religion means 
that, in the end, any conciliation is simply a  companion to eventual 
rejection. Indeed, late into the book, Hinde states his anticipation of 
‘a world that does not involve conflict arising from disparate beliefs in 
improbable entities’ (p.  218). That is not the language of conciliation 
and Hinde’s aetiological approach to the origins and development of 
religion is, as with David Hume and August Comte, expected to end in 
the natural dissolution of religion.
Central to Hinde’s aetiological approach is a functional conception of 
religion. A corollary of this is that religion clearly cannot be what religious 
persons take it to be. early on in the book, Hinde remarks that there are 
two possible approaches to an understanding of religion. ‘either religious 
beliefs ... refer to some transcendental reality’, or they are ‘products of 
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human nature in interaction with society and with the world’ (p.  7). 
This duality is, I think, misleading. It is quite intelligible to suggest that 
religion could be both an engagement, by certain receptive persons, with 
a  transcendental reality, where this engagement is affected by human 
biology in social and historical context. The fifth-century Christian 
mystic Denys, for instance, emphasised that religious belief is structured 
by our perceptual, cognitive, and linguistic capacities, as well as by our 
wider social and historical context. Hinde’s claim that either religion 
is what it claims to be – communion with transcendental realities – or 
that it is a  psychosocial phenomenon polarises the discussion. And 
since he has already rejected the transcendental interpretation, the only 
interpretation left is the naturalistic approach, one featuring, amongst 
other things, an ‘evolutionary history of gods’ (p. 65) and, into the future, 
‘a cost/benefit analysis of the impact of Christianity’ (p. 251).
There is much to learn from this book. It provides a useful survey 
of contemporary naturalistic approaches to religious belief and practice 
and the concise length of the chapters, plus the handy summaries, should 
earn it a place on philosophy of religion reading lists. Its scholarly and 
pedagogical utility aside, though, Hinde will not succeed in persuading 
religious persons of the falsity and disutility of their beliefs. Certainly 
one would not be persuaded of his conclusion that ‘ultimately we must 
face the fact that it is up to us, that we cannot hope for help from above’ 
(p. 262). Anyone seeking an introduction to contemporary naturalistic 
theories of religion will find this an excellent resource; however, only 
those already firmly in the naturalistic camp will find it persuasive.
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Theists and atheists continue to debate the cognitive status of religious 
belief. Is theism justified in the light of theories that explain religious 
beliefs as the result of natural cognitive capacities? This question has 
been around at least since William James wrote The Varieties of Religious 
Experience (1902). James believed that religious experiences (especially 
